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PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE
FRAGMENTED WEB OF THE
CONTEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Jim Rossi*
& GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
LAW. By Jerry L. Mashaw. New Haven, Con
necticut: Yale University Press. 1997. Pp. 209. $28.

GREED , CHA.as,
IMPROVE PUBLIC

Since World War II, public choice theory - defined broadly as
the application of the assumptions and methodology of
Inicroecon01nics to describe or predict the way public officials exer
cise power - has grown from a fledgling movement, gaining main
stream acceptance and respect for its insights into voting behavior,
judicial decisionmaking, and other public actions.1 Although a the
ory first explored by econoinists and political scientists, public
choice's normative insights have earned credibility in recent years
in acadeinic legal literature.2 Public choice's acceptance in the law
school curriculum is demonstrated by the recent publication of
* Assistant Professor and Patricia A. Dore Professor of State Administrative Law, Flot·
ida State University College of Law. B.S. 1988, Arizona State University; J.D. 1991, Univer
sity of Iowa College of Law; LL.M. 1994, Yale Law School - Ed. E-mail:
jrossi@law.fsu.edu.
1. Public choice insights have also contributed to the understanding of private decision
making in areas such as bankruptcy and corporate law. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public
Choice and the Future ofPublic-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REv. 647,
672-73 (1997) (reviewing MAxwELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw: READ·
INGS AND CoMMENTARY (1997)).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBuc CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRO·
DUCTION (1991); NEIL K. KoMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
IN LAW, EcoNOMICS, AND PUBuc POLICY (1994); Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Law review articles discussing or deploying public choice
ideas are far too numerous to catalogue here, but some representative examples not other
wise discussed in this review include Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Tenn Limits, 80 GEo.
LJ. 477 (1992); Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REv. 1305 (1997); Saul
Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Decisions Better Than One?, 12 INTL. REv. L. &
EcoN. 145 (1992); Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward A Game
Theoretic Analysis ofStare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736 (1993); Pablo T. Spiller &
Emerson H. Tiller, Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and
Judicial Review, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 347 (1997); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the
Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1309 (1995); Lynn A. Stout, Strict
Scmtiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Clas
sifications, 80 GEo. LJ. 1787 (1992).
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course material on the topic.3 However, despite public choice's
self-proclaimed positive nature - as a descriptive and predictive
tool - it continues to have its share of vigorous opponents, who
"angrily reject its pessimistic model of human behavior, and suspect
its analysis of being driven by an underlying dislike of regulation
and redistribution."4
Theories of administrative law have also been the subject of
much discussion in the legal literature over the past half-century.
Many contemporary scholars have attempted to weave administra
tive law statutes and cases into overarching theories of bureaucracy.
At the same time both bureaucracy and administrative law have
had a fair number of vigorous critics, some rejecting delegation as
inherently antidemocratic,5 others condemning the actions of bu
reaucrats as without common sense,6 still others decrying theories
of bureaucracy as incoherent and illegitimate7 or the administrative
state as unconstitutional.s
It thus seems that public choice and administrative law share a
common subject matter and vigorous opposition. Jerry Mashaw
seeks to address both in Greed, Chaos, & Governance: Using Pub
lic Choice to Improve Public Law. Mashaw, a Sterling Professor of
Law at Yale Law School, has had a major influence on federal ad
ministrative law for nearly three decades. His first two books, on
the social security disability claims process9 and the 1970s due pro
cess revolution,10 are cited regularly in the administrative law and
public administration literature. A later book on the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA's) failed auto
safety program, coauthored with David Harfst, led the charge
against judicial ossification of the administrative rulemaking pro
cess and secured Mashaw's reputation for using case-study analysis
3. See MAxwELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAw: READINGS AND CoM
MENTARY (1997).
4. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice and Legal Scholarship, 46 J. LEGAL Enuc. 490, 490
(1996). One administrative law scholar ascribes to public choice theory "general skepticism
about activist government in all its forms." Thomas W. Merill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 Cm.�KENT L. REv. 1039, 1053 (1997).
5. See DAVID SCHoENBROD, POWER WrraoUT REsPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (criticizing Congress's tendency to dele
gate lawmaking authority to bureaucrats).
6. See PHruP K. HowARD, THE DEATii OF CoMMoN SENSE: How LAw Is SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994) (providing anecdotal accounts of how bureaucrats lack common sense).
7. See Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L. REv.
1276, 1377-80 (1984) (decrying as "self-contradictory" models of bureaucratic legitimation).
8. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1231 (1994) (arguing the post-New Deal administrative state is unconstitutional).
9. See JERRY L. MAsHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISA
BILITY CLAIMS {1983).
10. See JERRY L. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE {1985).
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of bureaucracy to shed light on administrative law.11 Greed, Chaos
and Governance, more than any of Mashaw's other works, attempts
to explore systematically the normative issue of bureaucracy and its
role in a tripartite system of governance.12
In Part I, I introduce public choice theory and its now-common
association with a pessimistic view of public law, Mashaw's bete
noire. In Part II, I summarize Mashaw's applications of public
choice theory to the modern administrative state, placing his contri
bution in the contexts of his previous work and the current genre of
administrative law scholarship. As I will suggest, although his pol
icy recommendations are tentative, they are related by the use of
public choice tools as a mirror for evaluating myths associated with
one of the most cherished institutions in our democracy - the
legislature.
Mashaw's applications of public choice theory are lucid, reason
able, and often convincing; his is an important contribution toward
recognizing defects in the legislative process and giving both public
choice and administrative law broader legitimacy. Like Daniel
Farber and Philip Frickey, authors of one of the first legal books
with a public choice theme,13 Mashaw is not sanguine about the
coherence of using public choice to build grand theories of govern
ment or administrative law and searches instead for a middle
ground approach.
For Mashaw, public choice is most insightful for public law when
it yields usable knowledge, a realism that requires us to listen to
"whatever truths modern public choice theory is telling us without
succumbing to the excessively negative vision it so often supports"
(p. 31). Farber and Frickey, who adopt the neorepublican frame
work14 as a unifying perspective in their practical reason approach
to integrating public choice and public law, see public choice theory
as consistent with pursuit of the public interest.15 For Mashaw, who
distances himself from neorepublicanism and other unifying intel
lectual perspectives of administrative governance, public choice's
self-proclaimed positivism also does not imply normative skepti
cism about pursuit of the public interest. As I suggest in Part III,
11. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. liARFsT, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTo SAFETY
(1990).
12. The book elaborates and extends themes Mashaw developed more than a decade ago
in the Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University Law School, delivered in February
1986.
13. See FARBER & FruCKEY, supra note 2, at 116-18 (distancing their examination of pub
lic choice from grand theory and espousing a practical reason stance).
14. By "neorepublican" I mean the view, associated with modem civic republican or de
liberative democratic theories of governance, that self-interest is not the sole motivating fac
tor for individuals and that at least sometimes individuals will avail themselves of a public
regarding deliberative process.
15. See FARBER & FrucKEY, supra note 2, at 9-11.
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Mashaw's realism is truer to the positivism and method of public
choice theory, understood on its own terms, than the efforts of
those, such as Farber and Frickey, who utilize public choice tools
from a unifying practical reason perspective. Mashaw's fidelity to
realism, however, may come at some cost; absent a unifying per
spective of administrative governance outside of public choice the
ory, we can expect little more than rampant pessimism or
fragmented lessons from public choice.
I.

PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY AND THE R:rsE OF PESSIMISM
ABOUT PUBLIC LAW

Greed, Chaos and Governance, in large part a synthesis of sev
eral previously published journal articles,16 addresses several appli
cations of public choice theory and also distances public choice
from both its most ardent critics and its most ideological propo
nents. At the outset, it should be made clear that Mashaw does not
set out to glorify public choice theory. Instead, Mashaw attacks
head-on many well-accepted public choice analyses, including justi
fications for textualist judicial interpretation of statutes - advo
cated by Judge Frank Easterbrook17
and arguments against
delegation to administrative agencies - advocated by Peter
Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen Robinson18 and, more re
cently, David Schoenbrod.19 Yet, at the same time, Mashaw uses
public choice to make several tentative policy recommendations.
Mashaw's starting point is the dismal antiregulation, antidelega
tion stance often ascribed to public choice theorists. This reputa
tion, in part earned by public choice's association with one of its
�

16. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public
Law, 54 TUL. L. REv. 849 (1980); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics ofPolitics and the Under
standing of Public Law, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 123 (1989); Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the
Environment o.fAgency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games, and Accountability,
LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Spring 1994, at 185; Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Admin
istrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 81 (1985) [hereinafter
Mashaw, Prodelegation]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpreta
tion ofFederal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991). Related works by Mashaw that
surface from time to time in the book include Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation,
97 YALE LJ. 1685 (1988) [hereinafter Mashaw, As If Republican]; Jerry L. Mashaw, Explain
ing Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories ofLegal Development, 6
J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 267 (1990) [hereinafter Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process];
Jerry Mashaw, Imagining the Past; Remembering the Future, 1991 DuKE L.J. 711.
17. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, 1983 For
ward]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1983) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains].
18. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory ofLegislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1982).
19. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 5.
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first cousins, the Chicago School of economics,20 is reinforced by
two primary research agendas: the economist George Stigler's
"greed" research agenda, which describes regulation as driven pri
marily by private rent-seeking behaVior;21 and the "chaos" research
agenda, associated primarily with Kenneth Arrow, an economist
who early in his career offered a modem proof of the instability of
democratic processes.22
According to Mashaw, "the way we, as citizens, articulate and
understand our most cherished political ideal, democratic gover
nance, has been a product largely of our changing understandings
of how human beings do behave within particular institutional set
tings, not changing ideas of the moral underpinnings of democracy
itself" (p. 3). To illustrate this thesis, Mashaw turns to the political
science of the founding of the Republic and the progressive New
Deal era, and then to the modem political science from which pub
lic choice theory has sprung. After looking at history, Mashaw
characterizes today's "political life . . . as a world of greed and
chaos, of private self-interest and public incoherence" (pp. 3-4).
This vision provides a challenge for designers of public institutions
by making all public action "deeply suspect" (p. 4). Moreover,
Mashaw suggests, this negative vision already has shaped our un
derstanding of public life.
The insights of modem public choice theory can be traced to
James Madison, who was influenced by David Hume and (proba
bly) the French mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet.23 In
20. There is an apparent tension here, for the Chicago School would suggest that transac·
tion costs may inhibit private economic markets from moving resources to their most highly
valued use. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 {1960). Yet
political markets have sufficiently low transaction costs so as to render political structures
indeterminate in predicting the outcome of capture. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CmzEN
AND THE STATE: EsSAYS ON REGULATION (1975) [hereinafter STIGLER, CmZEN AND
STATE]; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MoMT.
SCI. 3 (1971) (hereinafter Stigler, Economic Regulation]. Other first cousins include the
Rochester School, which builds on William Riker's early work to emphasize how governmen·
tal outcomes are arbitrary and unpredictable, and the Virginia School, which builds on the
early work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock to emphasize the distinction between
constitutional rules and positive law. See STEARNS, supra note 3, at xviii-xix.
21. See STIGLER, CmzEN AND STATE, supra note 20; Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra
note 20. Stigler was awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on interest group theory in 1982.
22. See KENNETH J. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES {2d ed. 1963).
Arrow was awarded the Nobel Prize jointly with John Hicks in 1972, although for work on
general equilibrium theory, not Arrow's collective choice research. James Buchanan re
ceived the award in 1986, for his pioneering work - with Gordon Tullock - on political
economy, which is perhaps most consistently identified as the magnum opus of the early
public choice movement See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT. LoGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
23. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RisE OF POPULAR SoVER·
EIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 268-69 (1988) (discussing the influence of Hume's Idea
of a Perfect Commonwealth on Madison). Thomas Jefferson and Madison were familiar with
Condorcet. See Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE
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Federalist No.

10, "popular democracy's tendencies to instability,
oppression, and ineffectualness are set forth as the major problems
to be solved when constructing a government that can and will pro
tect individual rights" (p. 4). Madison intended to "eschew what
many thought democracy to be about - local autonomy, direct citi
zen participation, and the sovereignty of popular majorities" (pp. 45). Thus, the triumph of the Federalist-era political science is often
seen as the triumph of representative over direct democracy
in our
constitutional structure.24
In the New Deal era, the dominant view of human nature (the
"is") also influenced normative theories of democratic governance
(the "oughts"). By this time, both courts (slow to adapt the Consti
tution to new societal needs and demands) and representative legis
lative bodies (perceived as corrupt and incompetent since the turn
of the century) had fallen into disrepute. Initially, progressive polit
ical scientists returned to the anti-Federalist idea of the referen
dum, primarily to bypass the inertia of conservative legislatures, but
this did not continue for long. Soon, social psychologists' dire vi
sions of irrational drives, passions, and prejudices seemed borne out
by historical events, such as the democratic rise of fascism in Italy
and Germany.
The New Deal response was an emerging field of positive the
ory: management science. The industrial revolution had heralded
organized intelligence in the corporatibn as a cure for social ills.
According to Mashaw, "[w]hile representative assemblies had failed
to further Madison's 'permanent interests of the community,' those
interests might yet be furthered by rational planning. Public admin
istration thus was the key to �eeting public demands while avoid
ing the dysfunctions of either popular or representative democracy"
(p. 7). Led by the vision of reformers such as Felix Frankfurter,25
Louis Brandeis,26 and James Landis,27 apolitical administrative
agencies were a New Deal solution to the perceived failures of mar
kets and, perhaps more important, the perceived ills of democracy.
As Mashaw observes, the Federalist and New Deal political sci
ences converged. Both were suspicious of popular democracy for
the same reason - the perceived tendency of citizen passions or
interests to produce majoritarian tyranny. But, unlike the FederalL.J. 1219, 1221 (1994); see also Iain McLean & Arnold B. Urken, Did Jefferson or Madison
Understand Condorcet's Theory of Socia! Choice?, 73 PuB. CHOICE 445 (1992).
24. Contrast the view of the anti-Federalists, based on a fundamentally different view of
human nature. For them, direct participation was seen as enhancing civic virtue. P. 5.
25. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE Pusuc AND !Ts GOVERNMENT 145 (1930).
26. See Loms D. BRANDEIS, THE CuRSE OF BIGNESS (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934);
BRANDEIS ON DEMOCRACY (Philippa Strum ed., 1995).
27. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938); DoNALD A. RITCHIE,
JAMES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980).
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ist era, political science in the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to a new
positive theory: the theory of public choice. Public choice theory,
according to Mashaw, "seeks to explain, or at least to 'model,' 'ra
tional public choice' within the typical institutional environment of
the modem welfare state" (p. 10). The unifying thread of modem
public choice theory is that "[w]e must always seek to understand
political outcomes as a function of self-interested individual behav
iors" (p. 11). In other words, the political sphere is a market in
which voters and representatives, like consumers and firms, act as if
they are rational, maximizing individuals pursuing their self
interests.28 There is a market for collective social action. Like pri
vate economic markets, the collective social action market is also
subject to market failure, particularly when chaos results or there is
widespread abuse for private gain. Public choice theorists gear
much of their institutional design work toward correcting these
failures.
Today's public choice theorists regard many majoritarian
processes as chaotic. Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility Theorem which asserts that it is impossible to structure a voting scheme with
out making a choice which is imposed or dictatorial29 - illustrates
how normal majoritarian voting processes may fail to translate indi
vidual preferences into a collective preference. Most voting sys
tems have developed ways to constrain choice to avoid the pitfalls
identified by Arrow, but these institutional solutions admittedly en
tail a choice between incoherence, known formally as cycling,30 or
some form of unfairness. Of particular interest to modem studies
of bureaucracy, Arrow's theorem illustrates the awesome power as
sociated with agenda setting.
28. Mashaw flatly rejects the arguments of those who disavow public choice theory be
cause of its assumption that citizens are self-interested. P. 27. Recent research in psychology
suggests that the problem of self-interest may be more difficult than either Mashaw or critics
of the self-interest assumption recognize. Jonathan Baron, for example, has found that citi
zens, believing that they are acting in their self-interest, in fact regularly commit cognitive
errors by acting altruistically or cooperatively. See Jonathan Baron, The Illusion of Morality
as Self-Interest: A Reason to Cooperate in Social Dilemmas, 8 PsYCHOL. Sci. 330 (1997).
29. Arrow's theorem basically illustrates that no scheme of voting on individual ordinal
ranking of pairs can simultaneously meet the requirements of minimum rationality, the
Pareto standard, nondictatorship, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and universal ap
plicability. See FARBER & FruCKEY, supra note 2, at 38-39. There is no need to reproduce
the Impossibility Theorem, a generalization of the eighteenth-century proof known as Con
dorcet's Voting Paradox, here. In his book, Mashaw nicely illustrates Condorcet's Voting
Paradox and the contribution of Arrow's proof. Pp. 12-13; see also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 15 lowA L. REv. 949 (1990).
30. Arrow's theorem implies cycling only where certain conditions are present. For ex
ample, cycling does not occur if members of the decisionmaking group have unipeaked pref
erences, which may occur when legislators implicitly or explicitly agree in advance to rank
their choice on similar liberal-to-conservative ideological scales. See FARBER & FrucKEY,
supra note 2, at 48-49; DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 67-73, 94 (1989).

May 1998]

Public Choice Theory

1753

In addition, according to modem public choice theorists, the
political process is driven by private greed. As Mashaw notes, pub
lic choice has grown up to tell a "downright depressing" story about
legislatures and bureaucracy (p. 15). George Stigler applied inter
est group theory to the study of bureaucracy and brought "greed"
to the forefront of the modem political science research agenda,
helping to secure public choice's reputation as the modem dismal
science.31 According to the rent-seeking research agenda, private
interest groups seek to use the political process to shift resources
from the general public to their members. For example, logrolling
allows trading across issues in the political process. As described by
public choice theorists, logrolling can help· to solve some of the cy
cling problems Arrow identified.32 Logrolling, however, raises its
own set of problems. By trading across a variety of issues, a bare
majority can enact policies that benefit it, but whose net costs to the
minority create a loss for society as a whole (pp. 16-18).
Mashaw observes that the intellectual history of public choice
theory is long and thoroughly interdisciplinary.33 But contempo
rary public choice theory sounds a much more dismal theme than
its intellectual predecessors:
Whereas Federalist and New Deal political science feared only those
expressions of popular will unmediated by the rationalizing influence
of either a representative assembly or an expert bureau, contempo
rary theorists despair of expressing the will or preferences of the peo
ple through any device whatever. For them, our public laws capture
instead only a particular concatenation of private preferences made
politically relevant by the dynamics of self-interested behavior on the
part of voters and officials alike. The 'public' in 'public law' identifies
only the nature of the power that is put in the serVice of private ends.
Legislation elaborates norms without normativity; it expresses neither
the passionate commitments nor the reasoned judgments of a political
community. [p. 21]

While some of the insights of public choice theory were imple
mented by optimistic activists in the 1960s and 1970s - making
agency statutory mandates more specific, circumscribing enforce-

31. See STIGLER, CITIZEN AND STATE, supra note 20; Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra

note 20.

32. Logrolling, for example, might allow the voters considering three distinct funding is
sues to vote on all three issues in the covert of a single funding bill, thus trading their votes
across the different budget items. By avoiding comparison of each item, logrolling avoids
cycling.
33. For example, Arrow's twentieth-century contribution owes much to Condorcet, one
of Madison's contemporaries. Likewise, Stigler's contribution was shared by Madison in
FEDERALIST No. 10 and has a rich parallel in liberal and Marxist political science, as well as
in the work of David Hume and Condorcet. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ment discretion, and enhancing participation in rulemaking34 public choice theory has been invoked from the Carter administra
tion forward to justify pessimism about government and public law.
The last twenty years have seen movement, supported by argu
ments from public choice, toward parliamentary-style government,
balanced budget amendments, term limits, public finance of elec
tions, sunset laws, Office of Management and Budget rule review,
and deregulation. Mashaw writes:
The striking thing about the public choice literature . . . is the degree
of 'government failure' it finds. Indeed, the message is generally not
about the ameliorative steps needed to improve the political market
place. It is instead a message about why political markets cannot
work to satisfy the democratic wish, that is, to provide the people with
the government that they want. Modem positive political theory pro
vides a much bleaker picture of political life than virtually any of its
influential predecessors. [p. 12]

The overriding message of conventional public choice theory,
Mashaw suggests, is to return to the principles of the Federalists or,
better yet, the anti-Federalists: constrain government radically and
place trust in the market, voluntary associations, and community
based government.35
Together, the orthodox greed and chaos research agendas pro
vide a coherent thematic vision for applying public choice ideas to
public law, but the vision is pessimistic about government generally
and bureaucracy in particular. Public choice theory, understood ex
clusively through the greed and chaos lenses, provides strong rein
forcement to the market and consensus-based reforms so popular in
recent years at the federal and state levels.36 Apart from such re
forms, which focus primarily on dismantling the mechanisms of bu
reaucratic governance, the future for administrative law on this
understanding of public choice is dismal.37
34. For a critique of some of the institutional aspects of the participatory revolution in
administrative law, see Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs ofMass Participation
for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 173 (1997).
35. One recent administrative law scholar, agreeing with Mashaw's assessment, finds sup
port in post-1980 judicial doctrine. See Merill, supra note 4.
36. See Trmothy A. Wiikins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regu
latory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for
the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH L. REv. 479 (1995); see also HOWARD,
supra note 6.
37. Bruce Benson, succumbing to a similar reading of the public choice literature, writes,
"the real problem of bureaucracy is unquestioned acceptance of the belief that government
can solve most perceived problems, which allows bureaus to be established and expanded."
Bruce L. Benson, Understanding Bureaucratic Behavior: Implications from the Public Choice
Literature, 2-3 ECONOMIA DELLE ScELTE PUBBLICE 89, 114 {1995). This dismal view nicely
dovetails with Niskanen's classic hypothesis that bureaucracies will attempt primarily to max
imize their budgets and sizes. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRE·
SENTATIVE GOVERNMENT {1971).
.
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MA.SHAW'S APPLICATION OF PUBLIC CHOICE TOOLS TO THE
MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STA.TE

Mashaw's book does not endorse the bleak view of democratic
governance portrayed by many modem public choice theorists. In
stead, the book attempts to extract usable knowledge from public
choice tools by putting them to constructive use as a basis for insti
tutional reform. Three applications form the core of Mashaw's pro
ject: (a) use of public choice tools to defend rationality review of
legislation by courts and to critique the dominant public choice ar
gument in favor of textualist statutory interpretation; (b) use of
public choice tools to build a positive theory of delegation of polit
ical decisionmaking authority to agencies; and (c) application of
game theory to suggest abolition of preenforcement review of
agency rulemaking.
A.

Public Choice and the Nature of Judicial Review
of Legislation

Mashaw begins with the institution his earlier works addressed
with cynicism: the courts. Bureaucratic Justice criticized judicial re
view of social security disability cases as largely ineffectual.38 Due
Process in the Administrative State scolded courts for constitutional
izing participation in the administrative state through due process
doctrine.39 In The Struggle for Auto Safety, Mashaw and Harfst ar
gued that the judiciary was largely responsible for NHTSA's failure
to adopt rules regarding automobile safety.4o
One would not, based on his earlier books, think Mashaw a fan
of the courts. Yet, as he argues in this book, judicial review of legis
lative action is not necessarily incongruous with public choice.
Mashaw deploys public choice arguments both to justify rigorous
rationality review of statutes and to debunk those who invoke pub
lic choice theory to demand textualist interpretation of statutes by
judges. In both instances, Mashaw attempts to ground normative
arguments about the institutional role of judicial review of legisla
tion in public choice terms; his arguments are related by his implicit
recommendation that legislation be subjected to judicial constraints
similar to those applicable to actions by contemporary administra
tive agencies.

1.

The Case for Rationality Review

Courts in the twentieth century have struggled endlessly with
the issue of when a court may strike down a statute simply because
38. See MAsHAw, supra note 9, at 185-90.
39. See MAsHAw, supra note 10, at 254-71.
40. See MASHAW & HARFsT, supra note 11.
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it is arbitrary - that is, irrational or unreasonable. In the post-New
Deal era, courts have displayed almost universal deference to legis
lation. Courts almost always accept a statute if its ends are legiti
mate - if it can be said to have any rational basis. Against the
grain of most public choice commentators - as well as courts and
administrative law scholars - Mashaw, in public choice terms,
staunchly defends reinvigorating a more substantive rationality re
view of legislative decisionmaking.41
It is not surprising that public choice theory might justify
activist judicial review of legislation. The contributions of Arrow
and Stigler have led to widespread perceptions that legislation is
either completely arbitrary or the product of special interest deals.
For example, those who view statutes through Arrovian or interest
group lenses - particularly William Riker42 and Frank
Easterbrook43 - regard rigorous judicial review of legislation as
necessary to preserve individual liberty.
Mashaw's defense of rationality review of legislation contrasts
with the strong public choice argument for rationality review.
Mashaw maintains that judicial failure to entertain rationality anal
ysis suffers the same fault that Holmes recognized with Lochner: it
privileges one view of legislation - the view that it reflects the gen
eral will - criticized widely by public choice theorists writing after
Arrow. Yet in defending rationality review of statutes, Mashaw
does not suggest a return to Lochner. Rather, Mashaw suggests
that courts review statutes for "public regardingness" (p. 67). This
approach would suggest
judicial review of the adequacy of a statute's beneficial purposes when
judged in the light of its. harmful effects. Any citizen should be enti
tled to an explanation of why ber private harm is at least arguably
outweighed by some coherent and plausible explanation of the public
good. [p. 68]

Courts should uphold a statute as long as a "coherent and plausi
ble" public purpose can be identified (p. 75). In Mashaw's view,
rationality review of legislation is inevitable and should be pursued
regardless of the extant doctrinal subterfuges applied by courts and
41. Mashaw can only defend rationality review. to the extent public choice allows him to
do so. Public choice theory supplies a relatively weak sense of rationality. For the public
choice theorist, rationality is taken to mean "transitivity" or lack of cycling, as Arrow's theo
rem predicts. In other words, collective actions are irrational if they fail to yield consistent
results from the aggregation of individual preferences. Mashaw, however, has in mind a
more robust sense of rationality review.
42. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BE
TWEEN 1HE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND 1HE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982); William
H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation ofLegislative Choice: The Political
Consequences of Judicial Deference to f.egislators, 14 VA. L. REv. 373 (1988).
43. In this book, Mashaw responds to Easterbrook's writings from the years before he
became a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. See Easterbrook, 1983
Foreword, supra note 17; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 17.
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litigants.44 Moreover, Mashaw argues, public choice theory, partic
ularly interest group theory, can provide a pro-democratic argu
ment for rationality review in contexts in which the legislative
process has failed to produce public-regarding democratic results.
However, as Einer Elhauge has argued, interest group theory,
applied on its own terms, fails to provide a meaningful baseline for
evaluating "what level of petitioning effort is normatively propor
tional to each group's interest."45 In other words, public choice the
ory itself cannot provide a measure of "public regardingness,"
independent of some set of criteria for evaluating the success or
failure of the political process. Mashaw's public choice argument in
favor of substantive rationality review seems logical and plausible,
and is nicely complemented by recent attempts to justify rigorous
judicial review of legislation following United States v. Lopez. 46
Public choice theory, however, does not make explicit an adequate
set of normative criteria for evaluating the political process, and
thus fails to provide a meaningful measure of public regardingness.

2. Public Choice Against Textualism
Mashaw also attacks a widely endorsed public choice argument
in favor of textualist statutory interpretation. Reacting to a view
associated most closely with Frank Easterbrook, public choice argu
ments allow Mashaw to explore the risks and costs of textualist in
terpretation of statutes.
New Deal public interest legislation invited courts to discern the
general reform purpose that motivated the statute and to promote
that purpose in individualized cases (p. 83). Initially, in the 1950s,
New Dealers found the legal process approach of Hart and Sacks
particularly attractive, a way of rationalizing designers of statutes as
"reasonable people pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably" (p.
84). Sometime in the 1960s, however, this optimistic vision began
to unravel and eventually was replaced by a cynicism that continues
through the present:
In the 1990s governmental efforts tend to be viewed as inevitably
flawed. Public policy reform is directed almost exclusively at limiting
direct government expenditure and preventing the implementation of

44. On the pervasive application of subterfuges in due process and equal protection con
texts, see Gu100 CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
45. Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Re
view?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49 (1991).
46. See Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 695 (1996) (observing
that judicial requirement of legislative findings can work to promote congressional delibera
tion); Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety ofRequiring Legisla
tive Findings, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 731 (1996) (endorsing limited judicial requirement of
legislative findings as an intermediate level of process review).
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costly regulatory policies. Institutional reform consists largely of
privatization, desolution, and downsizing - and of creating road
blocks to regulatory initiative. [p. 84]

The 1990s pessimists' views of statutory interpretation contrast with
those of New Dealers. Instead of consulting a statute's purposes,
1990s courts might doubt that a statute, little more than the "vector
sum of organized political forces" (p. 84), even has public purposes.
On this modem view,
[a] court, or any interpreter, confronting such a statute will surely be
puzzled about how to proceed. At best it may be engaged in the en
forcement of compromise among contending special interests. At
worst it may be implementing legal rules whose only coherent expla
nation is the political advantage provided to legislators. [p. 85]

As Mashaw observes, this approach is certain to create a crisis for
purposive statutory interpretation. At the very least, it is absurd for
the interpreter of such statutes to fill in. gaps. Instead, such an in
terpreter might be led to focus more on the plain meaning of the
statute, as some suggest the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have
done.
A predominant approach in the political science literature often associated with Easterbrook - is to understand legislation as
a contract or deal. Easterbrook contends that statutory interpreta
tion is nothing more than the enforcement of an arms-length bar
gain. Statutes therefore should be construed to cover only those
domains of human conduct explicitly anticipated in the statutory
language. By applying doctrines of strict constructionism to statu
tory language, courts ensure that interested parties get precisely
what they bargained for in the political process.47
One problem with Easterbrook's approach, Mashaw notes, is
that it is based on Gary Becker's view of legislation, which predicts
that such deals will enhance - not reduce - general welfare.48 "If
one believes that private contracting among individuals and firms is
socially beneficial (the invisible hand), to put those contracts in leg
islative rather than contractual language is a mere formal change
that should not alter the aggregate welfare effects" (p. 89).
Easterbrook, however, does not have an explanation for why legis
lative deals are inherently evil. And, while Easterbrook does say
that contracts should be strictly construed, even this overstates con
tract doctrine. So, Mashaw suggests, understanding legislation as a
47. See Easterbrook, 1983 Foreword, supra note 17, at 15-18; Easterbrook, Statutes' Do
mains, supra note 17, at 544-51. The position attributed to Easterbrook precedes his appoint
ment to the bench. He since has softened his position by acknowledging some use of
legislative history to explain ambiguous language or to show "that a text 'plain' at first read
ing has a strikingly different meaning." See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1989).
48. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371 {1983).
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deal can just as easily lead us back to purposivism as strict construc
tionism. For Easterbrook's application to succeed, at a minimum
public choice needs a normative theory for explaining why interest
group-generatecl legislation is bad. Easterbrook himself harbors
much skepticism about public interest goals, but this skepticism is
not a necessary condition to the application of public choice tools.
Mashaw has raised a plausible criticism of Easterbrook's posi
tion, but his own argument in favor of substantive rationality review
suffers a similar defect in its failure to make explicit a normative set
of criteria for public -regardingness. While Mashaw does not, like
Easterbrook, claim that all interest group legislation is inherently
suspect, he does believe that such legislation will require reversal if
a coherent and plausible explanation of its public regardingness
cannot be given. Public choice theory cannot, on its own terms,
provide an adequate set of criteria for making this determination.
This normative limitation ·with public choice analysis aside,
Mashaw addresses another problem with Easterbrook's approach.
Much of the current attention to statutory interpretation has been
generated by Justice Scalia's attacks on the use of legislative his
tory,49 attacks that can be rationalized in public choice terms. Plain
meaning, according to Scalia, reinforces the legislative process as it
was envisioned in the Constitution and thus enhances the demo
cratic process as a whole. Voting theory, particularly the work of
Kenneth Shepsle suggesting the impossibility of mapping collective
decisions onto individual preferences,50 provides some support for
Scalia's views.
However, the authors who write collectively under the pseudo
nym McNollgast, in contrast to Shepsle, argue that nothing in vot
ing theory undermines the usefulness of legislative intent to aid
judicial interpretation of statutes.51 In practice, contra Arrow, leg
islative decisions do not cycle endlessly until they are cut off by
some arbitrary feature in the legislative process; instead, congres
sional organization excludes certain preference orderings from the
agenda and gives certain people veto or dictatorial powers with re
spect to the progress of a bill. Focusing on tbe agency �ide of public
choice analysis thus aids the search for legislative intent. Public
choice tools would suggest focusing on the, enacting coalition while
discounting cheap talk and statements by the minority. - For exam49. Scalia's first published attack on the use of legislative history is Hirschey v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commn., 777 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
50. See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a 'They,' Not an 'It': Legislative Intent as an
Oxymoron, 12 lNn.. REv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992).
51. See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, LAW & CoNIEMP. PRoBs., Wmter & Spring 1994, at 3. The professors who
comprise McNollgast are Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast.
·
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ple, statements by the President early in the legislative process
should be given weight, but later statements should be discounted.
Using game theory and inspired by McNollgast, Mashaw goes
on to argue that the legislature rarely is able to correct interpretive
mistakes in laws. First, he suggests, procedural hurdles and limited
time and resources may make correction improbable. Second, and
more insightful, even if the legislature can act to correct a mistake
with which it disagrees, "it will almost never end up with its original
policy reinstated, even if not a single member of the legislature has
altered his or her preferences."52
Therefore, Mashaw concludes, public choice theory has failed to
provide a decisive methodology for interpreting statutes. Indeed,
many of its ideas - such as Easterbrook's notion of legislation as a
deal and voting theory's chaotic characterization of legislation have proven "seriously unhelpful" (p. 104). Nevertheless, Mashaw
acknowledges some lessons from public choice, particularly a focus
on the speaker, notions of dynamic evolution, and the application
of game theoretic tools. His most notable lesson is that judicial in
terpretation can make it impossible in many cases for the legislature
to overturn the policy imposed by the judiciary; in most cases, it will
preclude the legislature from reenacting the original policy.
The use of public choice to attack textualist approaches to statu
tory interpretation is related to Mashaw's public choice argument in
favor of rationality review. The conventional view is that
[r]ationality review is strongly antimajoritarian because it forecloses
the implementation of the will of the majority. It is thus a danger to
democracy and requires extremely strong justifications, none of which
have ever been wholly successful. Judicial interpretation of statutes
by contrast is not only inevitable, it can be structured to be
prodemocratic, that is, to enforce the true will of the majority. More
over, should the judiciary err, the injury to majoritarian governance is
remediable by the legislature itself. [pp. 104-05]

Against this conventional approach, Mashaw suggests another al
ternative: courts should use rationality review to strike down stat
utes rather than to interpret them. According to Mashaw,
52. P. 102 (emphasis omitted). William Eskridge and John Ferejohn model the Article I,
Section 7 Game, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game,
80 GEo. LJ. 523 (1992), which Mashaw utilizes to suggest that "interpretation of the law
establishes a status quo point that will have the stability that our form of government gives to
any existing state of affairs." P. 103. The game goes something like this: Assume the House,
Senate, and President are each involved in new legislation. Each has slightly different prefer
ences, but they can compromise and adopt a policy. Basically, if the interpretation leaves at
least one of the House, Senate, or President better off, any one of these can take action to
block its revision. Thus, tripartite division and the presentment clause favor the status quo.
Judicial interpretation of statutes, Mashaw recognizes, has agenda-setting effects in the legis
lature: "[E]ven when the legislative process can overturn an interpretation, it literally cannot
escape the force of the interpreter. Interpretation has rearranged the status quo and thus
reconfigured the structure of subsequent legislative bargaining." P. 103.
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a court overturning a statute on irrationality grounds may invade leg
islative prerogatives for public choice hardly at all. By contrast, a
court misconstruing the legislature's statutes may often disempower it
from implementing anything . very close to the legislators' most pre
ferred policy. [p. 105]

Maxims such as "construe statutes to avoid serious questions of
constitutionality" are often, Mashaw suggests, more strongly
countermajoritarian than substantive judicial review. Courts will,
under Mashaw's normative application of public choice theory,
have an active role in reviewing legislation for rationality, but they
must construe legislative intent cautiously.53
The approach Mashaw proposes for judicial review of legislation
is remarkably similar to the process by which modern courts gener
ally review policymaking by administrative agencies: courts reluc
tantly interpret statutes, instead deferring to agency interpretations
of law, but exercise rigorous rationality review with the possibility
of reversal. Mashaw seems to suggest that modern democracies can
learn from the growth of the administrative state by reflecting on
how the traditional lawmaking body - the legislature - lnight re
act when subjected to judicial oversight similar to agencies. He uses
public choice ideas as a mirror, forcing us to reflect alternative insti
tutional restraints upon our traditional image of the legislature.
Mashaw's applications of public choice tools as a way of critiqu
ing legislatures move the debate forward considerably. His critique
depends upon a set of analytical tools outside of conventional pub
lic choice theory. Specifically, some of the insights of what has
come to be known as "positive political theory"54 - rational choice
and game theoretic analysis of political institutions - allow him to
transcend the dismal lessons of the orthodox greed and chaos re
search agendas. For example, McNollgast's research, which posits
assumptions about the behavior of institutions rather than individu
als, assists Mashaw in debunking conventional public choice argu
ments. Although well-accepted in the political science of
institutions, there is little agreement as to whether contemporary
public choice theory is sufficiently capacious ·to accommodate posi
tive political theory as an analytical approach alongside the greed
and chaos research agendas.55 Public choice and positive political
theory share a common subject matter, but public choice theory
-

.

.

53. In this sense, Mashaw's p.\'Oposal to reinvigorate substantive rationality review of leg
islation for public regardingness differs from Jonathon Macey's argument, that courts inter
pret statutes in a public-regarding way. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding
Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv.
223 (1986).
54. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1994).
55. See Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, Forward: Positive Political Theory in the
Nineties, 80 GEO. L.J. 457, 458-63 (1992).
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provides no methodological account of how assumptions about in
dividual behaviors are linked to institutional behaviors; on the
other hand, positive political theory often posits assumptions about
institutions, such as the legislature, without necessarily reconciling
these with findings about how individual behavior, such as that of
the legislator, is aggregated into institutional phenomena. Never
theless, Mashaw sees enough similarities between positive political
theory and public choice that he is comfortable applying these tools
side by side.56
B. Public Choice and Legislative Incentives for Delegation
Mashaw's deployment of public choice tools to evaluate myths
associated with legislatures also allows him to provide a rationale
for delegation to administrative agencies. His view contrasts re
markably the bleak visions of bureaucracy espoused by many other
public choice theorists. According to the "greed" research agenda,
at the core of the orthodox public choice explanation of legislative
incentives for delegation
[B]ureaus are conceptualized as being as susceptible to private inter
est influence as legislatures, and may assist the latter in obscuring the
true nature of legislative action from the general public. By passing
vague statutes that seem to be in the public interest, but then pressur
ing agencies to favor their supporters, legislators can have it both
ways. They can take credit for good government while pandering to
the special interests. Moreover, administrative institutions generate
their own bureaucratic aims. They may function much like interest
groups themselves by trading favors to powerful legislators (projects
in the home district, help for a valued constituent) for aggrandize
ment of bureaucratic budgets or prerogatives. [p. 21]

Louis Jaffe and Theodore Lowi, writing in the 1960s, were early
critics of delegation to agencies under broad legislative grants of
power.57 In the early 1980s, Peter Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and
Glen Robinson gave these arguments grounding in the public
choice literature.58 And, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this ap
proach to criticizing delegation to administrative agencies was re
vived in the writings of D_avid Schoenbrod.59
56. See Mashaw, Explaining Administrative Process, supra note 16, at 280 (noting distinc
tive methods but concluding that public choice and positive political theory share "a core
general presumption that political behavior is to be explained as the outcome of rational (and
often strategic) action by relevantly situated individuals within some set of defined institu
tional boundaries").
57. See Louis L. JAFFE, JumcIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION {1965);
THEODORE J. LoWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED
STATES (1969).
58. See Aranson et al., supra note 18.
59. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 5.
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These critics of delegation, who borrow heavily from public
choice ideas, have inspired a significant defense of delegation, pri
marily among those Mashaw tends to view as "idealists."60
Mashaw, no idealist, has also been an active voice in defending del
egation, relying heavily on public choice tools. Public choice theory
envisions the use of principal-agent models for examining the role
of agencies. The "McNollgast hypothesis" asserts the following:
electorally accountable officials must place the implementation of
public policies in the hands of administrators who have their own
designs, but they can still continue to control bureaucrats through
legislatively imposed administrative process requirements.61 Yet
McNollgast argues that Congress faces two major obstacles in con
trolling agencies: (1) information asymmetry, and.(2) the erosion of
an original legislative coalition over time..62
Mashaw suggests that the McNollgast hypothesis should not un
dermine public choice arguments in favor of delegation. If it is as
sumed that legislators have some independent preferences, the
McNollgast hypothesis can be decoupled from the notion that legis
lator preferences are a function of constituent or interest group
preferences. This move, made possible by the technique of positive
political theory, may be inconsistent with other public choice ideas,
but it does allow the use of agency theory to survive by assuming
that "[t]he legislators (principals) who vote for programs . . . prefer
that administrators (agents) carry out their instructions as specified
in the statute."63
Using this principal-agent approach, Mashaw presents an argu
ment for broad delegation of political decisionmaking authority to
administrative agencies. Critics of delegation have provided two
main lines of argument: Lowi argued against delegation on authori
tativeness grounds, asserting that statutes are the only legitimate
·

60. The "idealist" delegation vision, which Mashaw most closely associates with modem
deliberative democrats, holds that administrative procedure "contributes . . . to the construc
tion of an operationally effective and symbolically appropriate normative regime." P. 108.
Mashaw - always searching for empirical grounding - does not have faith, however, in such
idealist solutions. Instead, he suggests, the time is ripe for a realist revolution in administra
tive law.
61. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Polit
ical Control, 3 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 243 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and
Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgen
cies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McCubbins et al., Structure and Process].
62. See McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, supra note 61, at 435-40.
63. Pp. 121-22. Thus, Mashaw concludes, in salvaging the principal-agent model, that
"major insights into the structure and processes of federal administrative agencies as they
actually operate are unlikely to flow from viewing agency structure and process primarily in
terms of the monitoring and sanctioning problems that legislative controllers have with fed
eral bureaucracies." P. 129.
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vehicle for making law;64 John Hart Ely6S and Justice Rehnquist,66
by contrast, argued against delegation on accountability grounds,
positing that legislatures are institutionally more likely than bureau
crats to engage in accountable decisionmaking. The public choice
argument against delegation articulated by Aranson, Gellhorn, and
Robinson lends support to the latter view. In their view, public
choice theory predicts that there are two circumstances in which
legislators should be willing to confer broad authority on agencies:
(1) if a policy stands to benefit one group while imposing substan
tial costs on another, in which case delegation to an agency allows
legislators to claim credit and pass blame; or (2) if opposing groups
are unable to agree, in which case delegation allows legislators to
punt responsibility for the decision altogether. They conclude,
however, that such delegation will not likely enhance welfare, but
instead will produce "private benefits . . . at collective cost."67
Mashaw maintains that the prodelegation position looks at least
as good on welfare and accountability grounds as do calls for re
forms to statutory drafting made by critics of delegation. He argues
that three problems plague Aranson, Gellhorn, and Robinson's
claim that delegation to administrators systematically reduces wel
fare: (1) they equate democracy with legislative majoritarianism;
(2) they treat the agency costs of delegation without considering the
information and decision costs, which may be higher for a legisla
ture than an administrative agency; and (3) they analyze logrolling
without considering_ how agency changes the logrolling game (pp.
142-45).
Mashaw then attempts to present an affirmative case for delega
tion.68 First, challenging the welfare reduction argument, Mashaw
observes that delegation can help reduce the sum of decision,
agency, and error costs (pp. 148-52). Second, against the political
accountability argument, Mashaw contends that delegation can en
hance the responsiveness of political decisions to the desires of the
general electorate through accountability to the President, who is
more responsive than the legislature to diversity in voter prefer
ences and better able to avoid voting cycles.69 Implicit in Mashaw's
64. See Lowi, supra note 57.
65. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
66. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
67. Aranson et al., supra note 18, at 63.
68. Mashaw first articulated the argument in public choice terms in a 1985 article. See
Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 16.
69. See Pp. 152-56. Even if Congress were to adopt specific legislation, Mashaw observes,
discretion by agencies would still be necessary. Mashaw creatively posits a "Law of Conser
vation of Administrative Discretion": because the amount of discretion in a system is always
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prodelegation argument is the assumption that the Constitution
does not require the legislature to enact all laws, but instead re
quires only that lawmaking be done by a representative institution,
such as the legislature or President.7°
Mashaw's prodelegation arguments - as well as his discussion
of judicial review of legislation - should suggest that public choice
ideas provide powerful ways of critiquing legislatures as well as ad
ministrative agencies. Although predominantly used to critique the
institution of bureaucracy, public choice theory harbors no neces
sary alliance with antibureaucratic sentiments. As Mashaw illus
trates, public choice ideas also provide some compelling arguments
in favor of delegation of political decisionmaking authority to ad
ministrators, although this conclusion is qualified; Mashaw is care
ful to suggest that public choice does not provide any compelling
answer to the question of whether delegation is welfare-enhancing
or welfare-reducing.n
Yet, although public choice modeling may not provide a com
pelling formal answer to this question, public choice does provide
some powerful tools for argument. Mashaw's criticisms of
Aranson, Gellhom, and Robinson are convincing, but his reluc
tance to engage the argument that delegation to administrative
agencies can, in certain circumstances, enhance welfare proves dis
appointing. Mashaw argued in a previous article that "it makes
sense to have the delegation ·device available for use when and if it
would reduce the sum of decision, error, and agency costs."72 In
addition to the literature addressing the costs of congressional deci
sionmaking, which Mashaw discusses, there is a rich literature criti
cizing Congress's perceived legitimacy in the eyes of the public.73
Moreover, as some civic republican scholars have suggested, dele·

constant, squeezing discretion out of the system in one place merely causes it to migrate
elsewhere. P. 154.
·

70. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CoNSTITUTION AS PoLITICAL STRUCTURE 145-46
(1995). Redish attacks Mashaw's argument, suggesting that it is problematic as a matter of
both constitutional law and political theory. See id. at 143-49. Of course, Redish's response,
reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine, has its own problems. One flaw with the nondele
gation doctrine is that the judiciary is "institutionally incapable of creating and applying a
delegation doctrine." Richard T. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power: A
Response to Professor Lowi, 36 .AM. U. L. REv. 391, 393 (1987).

71.

For example, Mashaw writes:

Public choice can help us to better understand how certain choice procedures structure
or allocate decisional powers. It can help us to see possibilities for strategic behavior
and strategic equilibria that yield likely outcomes in particular decision processes having
particular structures and stakes. But it cannot itself tell us anything about whether those
outcomes will be welfare-enhancing or welfare-reducing.

P. 157.

72. Mashaw, Prodelegation, supra note 16, at 92.
73. See, e.g., JoHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETii THEISS-MORSE, CoNGRESS AS PUBLIC EN
EMY: PuBLIC ATIITUDES TOWARD .AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995).
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gation to administrative agencies may enhance welfare.74 Although
public choice theory, on its own terms, may not suggest that delega
tion to bureaucrats is always welfare-enhancing, sophisticated appli
cation of public choice tools might allow development of theories
explaining in which contexts delegation is most likely to enhance
social welfare. As with his earlier discussions of rationality review
and statutory interpretation, in discussing delegation to administra
tive agencies Mashaw has adopted a critical stance towards public
choice theory, albeit one that draws on public choice tools, rather
than an approach that uses public choice to construct a theory that
explains, in more than a very sketchy sense, under what conditions
delegation to administrative agencies is normatively desirable.
C. Public Choice, the Timing of Judicial Review, and Separation
of Powers
Insights from public choice theory can also help evaluate the
role of courts in reviewing agency action. Since the 1960s, the
American administrative state has undergone a paradigm shift away
from adjudication and toward rulemaking as the principal mecha
nism for agency action. A major difference between judicial review
of policies made through case-by-case adjudicative proceedings and
judicial review of rulemaking is the ability of parties to challenge
rules prior to their enforcement in individualized cases. Beginning
with the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 15 which articulated the standards for preenforcement judi
cial review of administrative rules, courts have liberally permitted
preenforcement review of final rules that mandate a substantive
standard of conduct.
Over twenty years ago, Paul Verkuil predicted problems with
this approach:
In the past, when a rule was reviewable only after enforcement, con

siderable time could elapse before the rulemaking procedures and the
factual basis for the rule were tested. As a result, review of the cir
cumstances surrounding the rule's enactment was secondary and
somewhat obscured by time; the main issue was the rule's application
to the particular respondent before the court. But with a final order
requirement tied more closely to notions of finality and ripeness,
rulemaking review can take place almost instantly and the focus on
the rulemaking process may be much sharper. In this sense, earlier
review means closer review, which itself leads to a vigorous judicial
scrutiny of the rulemaking modeI.76

74. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1543-54 (1992).
75. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
76. Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 205
(1974).
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In 1990, Mashaw and Harfst chronicled some of the adverse effects
of judicial review on rulemaking at the NHTSA,77 adding to the
growing literature that laid the blame for ossification of agency
rulemaking at the feet of the judiciary. Unlike others, who advo
cate easing the standard of review, Mashaw and Harfst suggest that
courts refrain from reviewing a rule until after the agency has ap
plied the rule against a private entity.78
Today's reformers, Mashaw observes, view rulemaking more as
part of the problem than the solution. Those who criticize courts
for ossifying agency rulemaking chronicle how judicial review has
adversely affected agency rulemaking as an external constraint on
agency decisions.79 For Mashaw, " [g]ame theory dramatizes the
power of external legal and political controls on the administrative
process. More important, the standard understandings of 'the prob
lem' besetting agency rulemaking look very different when ap
proached from the strategic perspective game theory provides" (p.
160). Game theory places focus on when judicial review should be
pursued, not, as others have suggested, on the standard or scope of
review.80
Most writing in the ossification literature agrees that "the real
impediment caused by judicial review is uncertainty" (p. 165). As
Mashaw observes:
Because the courts are relatively uninformed about what is important
among the many issues thrown up by parties seeking review of a rule,
and because they are technically and scientifically unsophisticated in
analyzing the issues that they perceive to be critical to a rule's 'rea
sonableness,' the perception in the agencies is that anything can hap
pen. This produces defensive rulemaking, if not abandonment of the
rulemaking process. [p. 165]
The results may have been motivated by private interests pursuing
various stratagems, such as delay. Focus on incentives for such be
havior - incentives that might be built into the institutions of ad
ministrative governance - could prove insightful.
To illustrate how these incentives affect the behavior of litigants
and courts, Mashaw develops a rulemaking review game. This
game assumes that "to the extent that an opponent of rulemaking
(regulatory or deregulatory) perceives �he use of an external obsta77. See MAsHAw & lfAru:sT, supra note 11.
78. See id. at 245-47.
79. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on 'Deossifying' the Rulemaking Pro
cess, 41 Dmm LJ. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial
Review ofAgency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the
1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 7 (1991). For a slightly different story, see Jim Rossi, Redeeming
Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the
Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wrs. L. REv. 763.
80. See McGarity, supra note 79, at 1453-54 (recommending replacement of "hard look"
witlr a more deferential metaphor).
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de to rulemaking to have a higher expected value than failing to
use it, that external constraint will be activated."81 Under current
law, rules by agencies like NHTSA or the Federal Energy Regula
tory Commission are immediately appealable to a court of appeals.
At the same time, there is typically a lead time, sometimes signifi
cant, before the rule becomes effective. Thus, following adoption of
a rule, a firm faces a decision whether to begin immediately to work
toward securing compliance or to appeal.
To simplify this game, Mashaw presents the choice faced by a
private firm or interest group as compliance or noncompliance with
the new rule. Initially, he assumes no penalties for noncompliance
because the rule is not effective or an appeal stays enforcement.
Given this assumption, firms do not view themselves as in a game
with the agency; rather, they view their position vis-a-vis other com
petitors. Here the dominant strategy for all parties, Mashaw illus
trates, is not to comply with the rule but to seek judicial review: "It
would appear that with preenforcement review no manufacturer
would ever comply prior to the deadline. Presumably they would
always seek judicial review because suit at least delays, and may
eliminate, the need to comply" (p. 168).
Mashaw then takes the analysis to the next level. The judicial
review game presents a free-rider problem; it is in the interest of
someone to sue, but each manufacturer will want to avoid bearing
these costs itself. This can be solved in a variety of ways. In prac
tice, it most commonly is solved by the formation of an industry
association or some other interest group. Without such a solution, a
new game may be played regarding who will sue. This game,
Mashaw observes, does not produce a dominant strategy, but pro
duces a classic "chicken" problem. Each player, while not itself su
ing, would like to bluff the other into suing. But, given that each is
better off if it sues than it would be if no one sues, it might be
rational for a player to chicken out and sue.82
The game changes again, Mashaw illustrates, if there is a penalty
for noncompliance pending the determination of the validity of a
rule. Here Mashaw maintains that his analysis teaches three les
sons. First, "without a penalty for noncompliance the balance of
the benefits or costs from litigating or complying will strongly favor
litigation" (pp. 173-74). Second, the presence or absence of a pen
alty will not be a determinative predictor of challenges. Mashaw
observes that,
81. P. 166. Mashaw speaks in terms of straightforward costs and benefits; he does not
attempt to model exceptional preferences, such as the firm opposed to all government regu
lation or the good citizen. P. 167. .
82. Of course, to maintain credibility for future bluffs, it may be possible that neither
would sue. Nevertheless, as Mashaw illustrates, the probability of at least one suit is 0.91. P.
170. The same type of analysis applies to beneficiaries.
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even with a penalty that is greater than the sum of compliance costs
and market share losses, an actor whose disbenefits from compliance
were only slightly greater than [those faced by another actor] would
still find it rational to bring suit or, what is the same thing, to fail to
comply and resist enforcement by raising the potential validity of the
rule as a defense. [p. 174]

Third, it suggests that a focus on the stringency or scope or standard
of review as a source of the problem of ossification may be mis
guided. "Judicial stringency is but one factor bearing on the likeli
hood of success in appealing a rule and on the payoffs to appeal
versus compliance. The timing of review and the conditions on its
availability also shape that calculation, as does the level of compli
ance costs" (p. 174).
Thus, Mashaw's analysis leads him to recommend efforts to ease
compliance burdens, as John Mendeloff has recommended in the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) context.83
Mashaw does not believe, however, that easing compliance burdens
alone will solve the problem of too little rulemaking; it will also be
necessary to eliminate preenforcement review. To begin, the
lengthening of time periods and reduction of a penalty can help to
reduce compliance costs. Further, echoing his previous observa
tions with David Harfst, Mashaw writes:
Tune and again, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reg. ulations foundered on the shoals of practicability or reasonableness.
Yet over time it became clear that many of the technological
problems that convinced courts to remand rules to the agency could
be solved. Moreover, they might have been solved much earlier had
attempts at compliance preceded resort to the judiciary.84

Mashaw's argument in favor of elimiJ:lating preenforcement re
view is insightful and original. Nevertheless, there are some
problems with the argument. Specifically, Mashaw may have un
derestimated some of the benefits associated with preenforcement
review of rules by courts. As Mark Seidenfeld has argued:
From the standpoint of social welfare, Mashaw's game theoretic anal
ysis is incomplete. It fails to· address when compliance with a rule
might be detrimental rather than beneficial. It also fails to incorpo
rate other indirect effects that delaying judicial review might have on
the overall rulemaking process. If art agency adopts a rule that it can. not justify both legally and as a matter of policy, the regulatory system
should avoid forcing compliance. To the extent that judicial review
83. See JoHN M. MENDELOFF, T.HE DILEMMA of: Toxic SUBsTANCE REouLAuoN: How
0VERREGULATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 115-16 (1988).
84. P. 178. Mashaw does temper his recommendation: "While preenforcement review
may have been particularly dysfunctional in the context of standard setting at the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, it may be extremely important to permit preenforce
ment review elsewhere, for example, of EPA air quality standards." P. 180.
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filters out such bad rules from good ones, pre-enforcement review
benefits society.ss

While Seidenfeld does not reject the abolition of preenforcement
review in all circumstances, he concludes that "the factors that go
into the balance of whether pre-enforcement review of a rulemak
ing is warranted are too diverse to permit a simple answer that
either pre-enforcement or post-enforcement review is always
best."86 Mashaw's confidence that public choice theory can compel
reform here seems mysterious, as he believes it does not allow us to
draw general welfare conclusions in the delegation context.
Finally, without any specific reforms in mind, Mashaw builds a
political oversight game as a means of relating his various applica
tions of public choice theory and addressing legislative veto of
agency rulemaking. He observes that "[u]ncertainty results not
from vague legal standards applied by relatively uninformed gener
alist judges, but from the risks inherent in interbranch competition
for control over policy" (p. 181). Both executive and legislative
oversight are subject to failures in controlling agency decisionmak
ing. Executive oversight, such as the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) technocratic cost-benefit analysis re
quirements, has been described as overtly political. Congressional
action has been more successful in forcing regulation than in react
ing to agency policymaking. Mashaw paints a bleak picture:
Political life resembles a theater of the absurd where general public
demand is satisfied by programs designed to fail and thus to protect
the "special interests" who trade politicians money for votes. Access,
participation, fair procedures and rational analytic routines are all
smoke and mirrors disguising the sordid business of politics as usual.
What's more, the public often seems to believe the "blame the bu
reaucrats, not us" version of legislative responsibility that sound-bite
journalism promotes. Nimbleness at credit claiming and blame avoid
ance, not the construction of sound policy processes, becomes the skill
that ensures incumbency. [p. 185]

Mashaw's oversight game assumes that political institutions, like
courts, are passive until called on to respond to some other person,
firm, or interest group. So, as with courts, Mashaw's game consid
ers the benefits, costs, and probability of success to institutions en
gaging in political oversight.s1
85. Mark Seidenfeld, Playing Games with the Timing ofJudicial Review: An Evaluation
of Proposals to Restrict Pre-enforcement Review ofAgency Rules, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 85, 97-98
(1997) (citations omitted).
86. Id. at 121. Thus, selective abolition of preenforcement review, according to
Seidenfeld, should be made by Congress. See id. at 124.
87. Mashaw urges that calls for transparency should be considered carefully:
"[t]ransparency lowers the 'agency costs' to organized interests," p. 191, i.e., those who al
ready have access to the political process. Yet Mashaw is not, like McNollgast, embracing
procedural reform as "another way of 'stacking the deck' for favored interests." P. 191. In
stead, "[e]ncouraging procedural transparency may be the best we can do to limit political
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Mashaw proceeds to model a separation of powers game in
three dimensions, representing the President, Senate, and House of
Representatives. From a normative perspective, Mashaw argues,
the external environment of agency rulemaking should be struc
tured to encourage agency policy choices that are welfare
enhancing for the institutions in the legislative-executive separation
of power game (p. 193). But if an agency should choose a policy
that lies closer to the President's preferences than to the House's or
the Senate's, Congress could quash this choice if it had the author
ity to veto administrative rules. Without the legislative veto, Con
gress is forced to resort to other mechanisms or to rely on the
judiciary to enforce the original bargain.
Of course, in the absence of effective judicial review or some
other mechanism to deter agencies from choosing a policy that lies
closer to the President's preference, the House and Senate can leg
islate to revoke the agency's policy choice. The agency's assertion
of a choice closer to the President's preferences, however, redefines
the status quo and the bargaining space.ss As a result, "[t]he stakes
involved in the constitutionality of the legislative veto may thus
have been somewhat higher than they appeared at first blush" (p.
193). Mashaw concludes:
Because policy choice in a bargaining situation is a function of both
the preferences of the actors and the status quo point, in the face of
presidential opposition Congress literally cannot get back to the pol
icy space that it thought it and the president had defined in the preex
isting statute. [p. 194]

Coming full circle, Mashaw posits that the legislative-executive
separation of powers game may have given rise to the judicial re
view game and, ultimately, ossification of rulemaking. According
to Mashaw, "[l]egal control is being employed to leverage political
institutional warfare about administrative policy in ways that dis
empower the policy process."S9

importuning and shore up administrative legitimacy, if not efficacy." P. 191. Transparency is
at best a strategic design tool, p. 191, but one that can have unintended perverse conse
quences, see Rossi, supra note 34.
88. The Environmental Protection Agency's 1997 clean air rules, establishing stringent
new standards for ozone and fine particulates, are a good illustration. See John H. Cushman,
Jr., Clinton Sharply Tightens Air Pollution Regulations Despite Concern over Costs, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1997, at Al. Although the EPA and the Clinton administration adopted
fairly stringent standards, critics set their sights on the Republican Congress. See Andrea
Marks, Losers in Smog Battle Try End-Run Attack, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 14, 1997,
at 3. Yet despite public opposition, the introduction of bills, and the potential existence of a
majority against the new rules in Congress, Congress has not garnered the support to reverse
the EPA and the administration to date.
89. P. 196. By contrast, parliamentary systems "tie the fate of elected politicians to the
efficacy of administrations," p. 198, effectively redefining the game.
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USABLE KNOWLEDGE AND THE VALUE OF A UNIFYING
THEORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Although Greed, Chaos & Governance · spends a significant
amount of time exploring how public choice tools might provide
insights to specific public law reforms, the book is as much an illus
tration of the power and limits of public choice ideas as it is a series
of arguments for particular reforms.
Mashaw intends his applications of public choice to yield usable
knowledge for institutional reformers, in contrast to both the ideal
ism of those who embrace the elusive public interest and the pessi
mistic, potentially destructive recommendations often associated
with public choice ideas. In this sense, Mashaw has much in com
mon with Farber and Frickey, who eschew grand theory and stake
out a middle ground in practical reason as a way of integrating pub
lic choice and public law. Yet, unlike Farber and Frickey, who pro
visionally adopt a neorepublican perspective, Mashaw is reluctant
to embrace any single unifying perspective of governance outside of
the public choice framework. Mashaw's cynicism about neorepubli
can ideas may be truer to public choice theory, but his realism evidenced by a reluctance to adopt a unifying perspective outside of
public choice - may come at a cost, albeit a cost that public choice
method may require on its own terms.
For Mashaw, usable knowledge is a middle ground. The ortho
dox greed and chaos research agendas have successfully presented a
unifying theme, but it is a dismal theme suggesting destruction or
dismantling of the administrative state. By contrast, usable knowl
edge recognizes that public choice ideas can provide some assis
tance to institutional designers without supplying a grand vision of
jaundiced optimism or rampant pessimism. Although public choice
theory cannot provide truths, it can provide arguments and advice,
so long as we do not demand unrealistically that it provide definite
answers and are not misled naively by those who claim stubbornly
that it does (p. 38). Public choice is a Comptean positive theory,
specializing in description and prediction, much like physics. The
fact that there is no unified public choice theory of phenomena such
as voting and institutional behavior, much like there is no unifying
theory in physics of how matter and energy behave, should not
stand as an impediment to learning from public choice's insights (p.
44).
Mashaw's notion of usable knowledge serves a function similar
to practical reason in Farber and Frickey's discussion of public
choice. Farber and Frickey believe that grand theory is of limited
value to law, a discipline that seeks primarily to resolve practical
disputes or to make practical recommendations about institutions.
Legal decisionmakers thus rely on practical reasoning, which "in-
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volves an analogical and inductive method, resolving new problems
by reasoning from well-established paradigmatic cases. " 90
Although deductive reasoning, the primary method of public choice
theory, will often yield plausible answers, "[m]ore often such . . .
answer[s] will ascend from a combination of arguments, none of
which standing alone would constitute a sufficient justification.
Such 'supporting arguments' are 'rather like the legs of a chair and
unlike the links of a chain."'91 Farber and Frickey believe that
practical reason will permit the integration of public choice and
public law, allowing constructive use of public choice insights.92
Their approach, however, is not without its methodological
problems. As Ed Rubin has suggested, the practical reasoning ap
proach may be flawed when applied to foundational methods such
as public choice, as it seemingly prejudges its subject matter by "re
jecting its methodology as a premise of the analysis before that re
jection is advanced or justified."93
In advancing their practical reason approach, Farber and
Frickey adopt as a provisional unifying perspective the neo
Madisonian view of the political system often associated with mod
em intellectual republicanism.94 According to Farber and Frickey,
"[l]ike Madison, we believe that no theory of government can ig
nore the powerful forces of individual self-interest and the critical
role of institutional design. It is equally one-sided, however, to lose
sight of the role of civic virtue."�5 Farber and Frickey present sev
eral illustrations of how neorepublican theories of democratic gov
ernance can accommodate public choice arguments.96
90. FARBER & FrucKEY, supra note 2, at 116.
91. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34
UCLA L. REv. 1615, 1645 (1987) (quoting ROBERT SUMMERS, INsTRUMENTALISM AND
AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 156 (1982)); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip N.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321 (1990); Daniel
A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REv. 1331 (1988).
92. For a defense of practical reason as a way of learning from the insights of law and
economics generally, see Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics
Movement, 84 GEO. LJ. 2071 (1996).
93. Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice in Practice and Theory, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1657, 1665
(1993) (reviewing FARBER & FrucKEY, supra note 2); see also Rubin, supra note 4, at 501
("[U]nless public choice analysis is allowed to proceed from its basic premise - what a liter
ary critic would call its donne
the strength of that analysis cannot be adequately
assessed.").
94. See Seidenfeld, supra note 74; Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REv 29 (1985).
95. FARBER & FrucKEY, supra note 2, at 11.
96. Although Farber and Frickey see neorepublicanism as acco=odating and organizing
some public choice ideas, they reject the strong version of republicanism that would suggest
that voters and legislators are always motivated by publiq spirit rather than self-interest. See
id. at 45-46. Their vantage point, neorepublicanism, probably entails practical reasoning to
the extent that modem republicanism requires consideration of various inco=ensurable
concepts such as the individual and the collective selves. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond The
Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1564-65 (1988).
-
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Mashaw also seeks to domesticate public choice theory, but
rather than look outside public choice, as do Farber and Frickey, he
urges public choice "lite." Despite any surface similarity between
usable knowledge and practical reason, the methods are distinct.
Mashaw does not reject the compatibility of neorepublican political
theory and some public choice ideas. He sees no necessary connec
tion, however, between neorepublicanism and public choice. In his
applications, he distances himself from those who would embrace
neorepublicanism as the vantage point for evaluating public choice
ideas.97 Apart from the deductive method of public choice theory,
defined broadly to include positive political theory, Mashaw does
not explicitly embrace any singular intellectual perspective of ad
ministrative governance as a vantage point for evaluation, whether
republicanism, pluralism, or any other theory. Thus, although
Mashaw's previous case studies of the Social Security Administra
tion and NHTSA are beautiful illustrations of a practical reasoning
approach, Greed, Chaos and Governance deploys a method distinct
from tha_t of Farber and Frickey. Mashaw, wishing to give public
choice arguments the most sympathetic assessment possible, em
braces public choice tools as a common language and eschews any
extra-public choice unifying perspective, carefully and realistically
describing the different stories public choice has to tell about ad
ministrative governance. In this sense, Mashaw attempts to use
public choice theory on its own terms, albeit with a healthy degree
of academic cynicism or realism.
Nevertheless, Mashaw acknowledges that most public choice
methodology, including his own realism, has normative conse
quences. As Mashaw suggests, writers such as Steven Kelman,98 a
neorepublican critic of public choice, and Geoffrey Brennan and
James Buchanan,99 venerable public choice advocates, have ac
knowledged that positive models can (and do) have normative im
plications. Although Buchanan and Brennan may disagree on
substance with Kelman, all three agree that preferences are not
wholly exogenous to politics; rather, they are in part a function of
how people go about governing themselves. Public choice theory
and its application to institutional design can and do influence the
preferences of actors.100
97. For Mashaw, neorepublicanism is too idealistic to reconcile with most public choice
arguments. Pp. 108, 111-18; see also Mashaw, As If Republican, supra note 16 (presenting a
stronger case against republicanism).
98. See Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, Pun. INTEREST, Spring 1987, at
80, 93-94.
99. See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case
for the "Nobel" Lie, 74 VA. L. REv. 179, 187 (1988).
100. "[A]t the birth of political societies, it is the leaders of the republic who shape the
institutions but . . . afterwards it is the institutions which shape the leaders of the republic."
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Indeed, this is where public choice theory, as a method, raises
the most serious difficulties for legal scholarship generally and pub
lic law in particular. Mashaw argues that Kelman's neorepublican
critique of public choice theory - which alleges that public choice's
"[c]ynical descriptive conclusions about behavior in government
threaten to undermine ·the norm prescribing public spirit"101 - is
inadequate. Kelman suggests that if we design public institutions as
if people were public-spirited rather than self-interested, then those
citizens would emerge (p. 27). Yet Mashaw believes that the en
dogeneity of preferences adopted by neorepublicans, such as
Kelman, simply substitutes one implausible and idealistic view of
human nature with another (p. 27). Instead of adopting this out
right rejection of public choiCe's first-order assumption, Mashaw
borrows from Buchanan and Brennan's response, urging that "we
design institutions to protect us from self-interested political action,
while recognizing that ·such activity may shape our attitudes to
wards governance" (p. 26).
By eschewing any extra-public-choice-unifying perspective,
Mashaw may be truer to public choice methodology than Farber
and Frickey. His reluctance to embrace a unifying intellectual per
spective of governance, however, broadens the range of knowledge
that public choice will yield, while also limiting the ability to deem
the knowledge usable. This, for example, probably precludes
Mashaw from developing a more complete explanation for when
delegation to administrative agencies is desirable. It also poten
tially weakens Mashaw's ability to further his main thesis - that
public choice ideas can be salvaged from those who wish to disman
tle government. Without a referent point, usability is a somewhat
shallow normative concept. For example, Mashaw's argument in
favor of rationality review must look outside public choice for nor
mative insights as to when statutes are not public-regarding. While
Mashaw's illustration of how public choice concepts can apply to
institutional design is reasonable, lucid, and often convincing, his
method fails to make explicit the criteria for deeming "usable" the
knowledge public choice arguments yield. As a result, his various
applications of public choice to institutional design, though clear
and insightful in isolation, are tentative and seem somewhat frag
mented when placed together in a book. All that seems to tie them
together is their fidelity to public choice ideas, construed broadly to
include the tools of positive political theory, a common theme of
criticism of the legislature, and Mashaw's cynical realism. No nor
mative framework or perspective organizes the various insights of
JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAU, THE SocIAL CoNTRAcr 84 (M. Cranston trans., Penguin Books

1968) (1762) (citing the eighteenth-century French philosopher andjurist Montesquieu).
101. Kelman, supra note 98, at 93-94.
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the book; in the parlance of some legal pragmatists, the beliefs
Mashaw's book supports are not woven into a coherent web.1°2
For legal scholars, the application of public choice assumptions,
method, and tools raises a special chal.lenge, especially if the scholar
is to understand these ideas and take them seriously. For those who
wish to use public choice ideas to understand public law, adoption
of a unifying intellectual perspective such as neorepublicanism
makes it simpler and more practical to glean usable knowledge
from these tools. The adoption of a unifying perspective also
makes explicit the assumptions of the evaluator's method. A unify
ing perspective may certainly limit an evaluator's thesis to those
who are convinced by the perspective, but it also can assist in artic
ulating explicit criteria for rendering knowledge usable, as well as
for deriving a normative baseline for evaluation of the political pro
cess.103 So understood, a unifying perspective is not a synonym or
furtive excuse for engaging in grand theory, but instead can bolster
a pragmatic approach, such as Mashaw's, by allowing the integra
tion of otherwise disparate interdisciplinary ideas - and the beliefs
they support - into a coherent web.
Of course, Mashaw's realist reluctance to adopt an extra
public-choice-unifying perspective may be warranted. Understood
on its own terms, public choice theory purports to be nothing more
than a Comptean positive science, deploying assumptions about
human behavior and an economic methodology to generate de
scriptive and predictive hypotheses, which can be tested empiri
cally. Perhaps Mashaw, like many economists and political
scientists who utilize public choice theory, is simply being true to
the positivist method. Mashaw's bete noire, the dismal orthodoxy
attributed to public choice, provides a clarion normative theme:
government, particularly bureaucracy, is bad. Mashaw's realism,
coupled with his fidelity to public choice method, challenges this
theme but yields little more than fragmented lessons about public
law. Perhaps this is all we can expect from public choice method,
applied on its own terms: rampant pessimism or fragmented les
sons. Mashaw's realism would leave us content taking the latter
from public choice ideas.
CONCLUSION

For some, public choice theory has come to be associated with
antigovernment ideology, wholesale critiques of judicial involve
ment in governance, cramped textualist interpretation of statutes,
102. See Farber, supra note 91, at 1336 ("[A]n interlocking web of belief, in which each
belief is supported by many others rather than by a single foundational 'brick,' is inherently
far sturdier than a tower.").
103. See Elhauge, supra note 45.
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and anti-administrative agency positions. Mashaw's book teaches
us that public choice theory has no necessary alliance with such po
sitions. The book is notable for its careful, studied applications of
public choice, especially its innovative criticisms of the legislature
and its constructive approach towards understanding delegation to
bureaucracy. An appreciation of bureaucracy as an institution in
our system of democratic governance, as Mashaw urges, is neces
sary before we can "pursue the public interest by attempting to
learn from those who sometimes seem to suggest that it could not
possibly exist" (p. 209). Greed, Chaos, & Governance challenges us
to bring public choice theory to bear on dialogue about public
spirited institutional reform. Hopefully, legal scholars will rise to
this challenge, engaging public choice arguments, including
Mashaw's, in constructive ways to help us understand the complexi
ties of public law and to weave a coherent web of knowledge about
the administrative state.

